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AZIZ CASE AND UNFAIR CONTRACT 
TERMS IN MORTGAGE LOAN 
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS TO BE 
LEARNED IN SPAIN* 
Immaculada Barral-Viñals** 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper provides an overview of the judgments given by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning unfair contract terms 
(UCTs) in mortgage loan agreements. My analysis of recent ECJ 
decisions will focus on three aspects. First, focusing on the consumer-
friendly interpretation of the UCT Directive,1 which has led to the 
development of substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness, most 
notably in Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa.2 Second, I will identify various points 
at which the Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be 
revised. Third, I will focus on the possibility of controlling UCTs in 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
This article’s approach will be based on a comparison of 
developments in ECJ decisions and recent decisions by Spain’s 
Supreme Court, the Tribunal Supremo (T.S.). This comparison 
indicates that the T.S. has adopted an interpretation rule for mortgage 
loan agreements that is far from consumer-friendly. This finding is 
                                                 
*  The final version of  this text was ended on October 15, 2014. 
** University of Barcelona; ibarral@ub.edu. 
1   Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).  
2   Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).  
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supported by decisions made by the T.S. on May 9, 2013,3 a month and 
a half after the ECJ decision in Aziz, and September 8, 2014.4 
The “social engineering” that emerges from ECJ decisions is a 
clear indication of the situation in Spain today, where judges seek 
preliminary rulings concerning the scope and interpretation of the 
UCT Directive to develop principles for a more consumer-friendly 
interpretation of mortgage foreclosure proceedings.5 The lower courts 
in Spain are taking the lead to further develop these principles to 
protect consumers in real estate transactions, because the Spanish 
legislature and the T.S. seem reluctant to do so in what has become a 
major concern of Spain’s social policy.6 For instance, the most far-
reaching legislation requires renegotiation of mortgage terms only 
when “low-income borrowers” are involved.7 “Low income 
borrowers” is a category that varies in the different statutes but which 
is highly limited in scope to include only those with very low or none 
incomes, and a high average of the rent used in paying the loan (more 
than 60%).8 The ultimate option in this case for this category of 
consumers is the datio pro soluto, i.e., providing the same effects as 
non-recourse loans available in the United States, which affects an 
even smaller group of borrowers. Besides carving out an exception for 
this small, unique group of consumers, legislation reforms have 
focused chiefly on what constitutes unfair contract terms. 
                                                 
3   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).  
4   S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R. J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).  
5   See JOSÉ MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ SEIJO, LA DEFENSA DE LOS 
CONSUMIDORES EN LAS EJECUCIONES HIPOTECARIAS (2013). 
6   Hans-W. Micklitz, Unfair Contract Terms—Public Interest Litigation before 
European Courts—Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU 
CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyne Terryn, Gert 
Straetmans & Veerle Colaert eds., 2013).   
7   See Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E. 
2012, 60) (Spain); Urgent Measures to Strengthen Protection Measures to Mortgage 
Debtors (B.O.E. 2012, 276) (Spain); Rights of  Persons with Disabilities and their 
Social Inclusion (B.O.E. 2013, 289) (Spain) [hereinafter Rights of  Persons with 
Disabilities].  
8   Id.  
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This article seeks to ascertain the consequences of ECJ Aziz 
case on UCTs.9 My main goal is to examine the way in which the ECJ’s 
interpretation of UCTs has given rise to the construction of a 
substantive concept of unfairness by analysing standard contract terms 
(SCTs) included in almost all mortgage loans granted in Spain.  
Further, this paper will focus on the way in which these non-binding 
clauses can result in a stay of foreclosure proceedings and can also 
reduce the mortgager’s debt. Indeed, UCTs in Spain today constitute 
an indirect remedy against foreclosure, which can dramatically impact 
medium to low income families. 
I. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS: WHY THEY SEEM TO BE A USEFUL 
TOOL IN MORTGAGE LOAN AGREEMENTS 
SCTs often used in mortgage loan agreements are considered 
a means of unilaterally fixing contract clauses. As such, SCTs 
significantly limit freedom of contract, a notion embodied in the term 
“free will” in Article 1255 C.C.10 The seller or supplier of mortgage 
loans fixes SCTs in advance, and the borrower must accept or reject 
them on a “take it or leave it” basis. Since SCTs are not individually 
negotiated, they are subject to both an incorporation and a fairness test 
when the adherent－the non-professional party－is legally considered 
a consumer.11 In Spain, SCTs are governed by two different 
regulations, depending on whether the adherent is a consumer or not: 
the Standard Contract Terms Act of 1998 (Ley de Condiciones 
Generals de la Contratación (LCGC)),12 which governs SCTs in any all 
kinds of contract, and the General Law for the Protection of 
Consumers (consolidated by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Que 
Aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de 
Consumidores y Usuarios y Otras Normas Complementarias 
                                                 
9   I will not conduct an in-depth analysis of mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings, which is the main issue raised by Aziz. 
10   C.C., art. 1255 (2011) (Spain); Elena Lauroba Lacasa, Rapport Introductif: 
Les Clauses Abusives, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES, SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION 
COMPAREE 9 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud & Elena Lauroba eds., 2013). 
11   General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users (B.O.E. 2007, 
287) (Spain) [hereinafter TRLGDCU]. 
12   General Conditions of Contract (B.O.E. 1998, 89) (Spain) [hereinafter 
LCGC]. 
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(TRLGDCU)),13 which only applies to business-to-consumer (B2C) 
contracts. For contracts that do not involve consumers, if the adherent 
has knowledge of existence of SCTs in the contract, the contract will 
be binding on both parties, even if the adherent has not yet read or 
understood the SCTs. As such, the law deals only with the external 
control of SCTs by employing the incorporation test, under which 
SCTs may be considered part of the binding contract if the adherent 
has had the possibility of knowing that the contract contains SCTs.14 
The incorporation test also applies when a contract containing SCTs 
involves a consumer. However, a fairness test is an additional internal 
control applied with respect to the content of the SCTs. This test 
determines whether there is a significant imbalance between parties’ 
bargaining power so that and if an SCT is deemed unfair, it will not be 
binding on the consumer.15 
The Spanish legal framework in relation to UCTs has not 
evolved due to the economic crisis of 2008, except in one aspect: 
Article 27 of Act 3/201416 referring to the non-revision of a UCT, 
which is explored further below. However, the ECJ’s ruling in Aziz 
lead to the Act 1/2013 of 14 May,17 on measures to strengthen the 
protection to mortgagors, debt restructuring and social rent that had 
                                                 
13   TRLGDCU (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
14   However, the adherent’s acceptance does not imply that he has actual 
knowledge of  the material scope of  each term. Whether the SCTs are incorporated 
as part of  a binding contract depends on “accessibility” of  the adherent to the SCTs. 
Thus, it is unreasonable to uphold that the adherent has consented to the content of  
the STCs, since the existence of  a possibility for the adherent to know the STCs does 
not necessarily mean that the adherent has made an informed decision. See EUGENIO 
LLAMAS POMBO, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY GENERAL DE DEFENSA DE 
CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS 284 (2005). 
15   A further condition for enforcing SCTs is that they must be drafted in 
plain, intelligible language and have an interpretation contra proferentem, i.e., the 
supplier must assume the consequences of  confusing wording. A lack of  
transparency is a ground for non-incorporation, since confusing clauses cannot form 
part of  a contract. LCGC art. 5, 7 (B.O.E. 1998, 89). This idea is developed further 
in the T.S. judgment of  9 May 2013, S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) 
(Spain), which seeks to construe unfairness in terms of  a lack of  transparency.  
16   See Consumer Protection Act (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain). 
17  Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social Rents 
(B.O.E. 2013, 116) (Spain) [hereinafter Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt 
Restructuring and Social Rents].  
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modified the Mortgage Act (Ley Hipotecaria –LH-)18 and the Code of 
Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) with regard to the 
consequences for mortgage foreclosure proceedings when the 
mortgage loan agreement contains clauses or terms that are be deemed 
unfair. Although various ECJ cases have redefined Spanish legislation 
on UCTs in mortgage agreements,19 these cases are contrary to the May 
9, 2013 decision issued by the T.S., which has generated considerable 
controversy. The practical impact of these ECJ judgments on SCTs is 
of great importance, since the majority of mortgage loan agreements 
in Spain contain STCs. 
The lower Spanish courts—Audiencias provinciales—have 
examined a number of frequently used SCTs in mortgage loan 
agreements that might be deemed unfair, including SCTs relating to: 
(1) the early maturity of the loan, (2) the default interest rate, (3) the 
unilateral determination of the amount owed, and (4) the so-called 
“floor clause” in variable interest loans. In Aziz, the ECJ ruled on the 
fairness of the first three types of SCTs. Preliminary rulings by the ECJ 
focused on two aspects: the criteria to be applied in examining the 
fairness of a clause and the effects of an unfair clause. Similarly, the 
T.S. has ruled on the “floor clause,” which is a problem only in Spain 
in the context of the UCT Directive concerning the scope of 
application of the fairness test to the main subject matter of the 
contract. 
We start by examining this latter point as a prius for the analysis 
of the above-mentioned clauses. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIRNESS TEST TO THE MAIN 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT 
An initial set of ECJ and T.S. decisions deal with the 
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature. Article 
                                                 
18   Mortgage Act) (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain) [hereinafter Mortgage Act].  
19   Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-04785; Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274 (June 14, 2012); Case C-415/11, Mohamed 
Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013); Case 
C-226/12, Constructora Principado v. José Ignacio Menéndez-Álvarez, 2014 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 7 (Jan. 6, 2014). 
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4(2) of the UCT Directive states that the assessment of the unfairness 
of a contractual term should not include the “main subject matter of 
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration . . . as 
against the services or goods supplied in exchange . . . .”20 As such, the 
ECJ has been requested to give a preliminary ruling as to whether it is 
actually possible to assess the fairness of the subject matter of the 
contract and the adequacy of the price and remuneration in light of the 
value of the services or goods supplied in exchange, that is to say, the 
fairness of the contract price. 
The question is whether the transposition of the UCT 
Directive by the Spanish legislature complies with Article 4(2) of the 
Directive, given that Spanish law has not expressly transposed this 
limit to the assessment of fairness. This question was answered by the 
ECJ in Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc.21 The Court in Ausbanc held 
that a Spanish law providing for an assessment of the fairness of terms 
relating to the main subject matter of the contract was consistent with 
the UCT Directive.22 The ECJ determined that Article 4(2) is not a 
binding provision. Member States may opt not to transpose Article 
4(2) and, in so doing, may afford a higher level of protection than that 
established by the Directive.23 This option satisfies the requirement in 
the UCT Directive of “minimum harmonisation” of national 
                                                 
20   Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, art. 4(2). 
21   See Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. I-04785.   
22   In Ausbanc, the T.S. requested the ECJ make a preliminary ruling 
regarding the unfairness of  a SCT that allowed the bank to round up the interest rate 
in a variable mortgage agreement to the next quarter of  a percentage point. See id. 
23   It follows from the wording of  Article 4(2) of  the UCT Directive that 
“[Article 4(2)] . . . cannot be regarded as laying down the scope ratione materiae of  the 
Directive.” Id. at I-4837. Article 4(2) cannot be inferred as constituting “a mandatory 
and binding provision and that, as such, its transposition by Member States was 
obligatory. On the contrary, the Court merely held that, in order to safeguard in 
practice the objectives of  consumer protection pursued by the Directive, any 
transposition of  Article 4(2) had to be complete, with the result that the prohibition 
of  the assessment of  the unfairness of  the terms relates solely to those which are 
drafted in plain, intelligible language.” Id. at I-4838. Further, the Court in Ausbanc 
stated that “it must be held that, in authorising the possibility of  a full judicial review 
as to the unfairness of  terms such as those referred to in Article 4(2) of  the Directive, 
provided for in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, 
the Spanish legislation at issue in the main proceedings makes it possible for 
consumers to be afforded, in accordance with Article 8 of  the Directive, a higher 
level of  protection than that established by that directive” Id. at I-4838. 
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legislation.24 A number of decisions by the T.S. adhere to this 
interpretation of the UCT Directive, as I will explain. Notably, prior to 
Ausbanc, the T.S. had already ruled in a manner consistent with the 
ECJ’s holding. For example, in T.S. judgement of 1 July, 2010,25 which 
concerned clauses defining risks in insurance contracts, the T.S. ruled 
that courts should assess the fairness of clauses related to the main 
subject matter of such contracts because it determines the price of the 
insurance. 
Yet, more noteworthy is the judgment against this 
interpretation, since it deals with mortgage contracts, bearing in mind 
that only a clause unrelated to the subject matter of the contract or the 
adequacy of the price can be submitted to the unfairness test. Thus, 
the question is that the T.S. resolution of 18 June, 2012, which is 
concerned with remunerative interest rate, states that Spanish 
legislation on UCTs prohibits the assessment of the fairness of 
contract clauses that are related to price.26 It appears that the 
remunerative interest rate, which is the main tool for calculating the 
contract price, is outside the scope of the unfairness test. 
Control of the remunerative interest rate clearly entails an 
analysis of the adequacy of the contract price, since the assessment of 
the nominal interest rate applied is the “price” of the loan. No 
assessment of fairness, however, is undertaken in fixing this rate. 
Instead, fairness is assessed as to the price agreed to by the parties. 
This conceptual separation of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive of the 
control of the price as the main subject matter of the contract, and the 
adequacy of the price and the remuneration, on the one hand, as 
against the services or goods supplied in return, on the other, was 
highlighted by the ECJ in Constructora Principado v. Álvarez.27 The nature 
of unfairness does not require an economic imbalance in the contract, 
which the Court understands as not being relevant. Instead, unfairness 
refers to the legal imbalance created by those contract clauses that 
                                                 
24   Id. at I-4836. 
25   S.T.S. Jul. 1, 2010 (R.J., No. 6031/2010) (Spain).  
26   S.T.S. June 18, 2012 (R.J., No. 5966/2012) (Spain).  
27   In Constructora Principado (like Ausbanco, a preliminary request from a 
Spanish judge), the ECJ was asked to determine whether obliging consumers to pay 
for expenses that by law need to be borne by the sellers is unfair. See Case C-226/12, 
Constructora Principado, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 7, ¶ 44 (Jan. 6, 2014). 
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impose on the consumer certain charges for which he is not liable 
under the applicable law. In other words, it is unfair to create a legal 
imbalance, irrespective of the economic impact on the parties.28 
Spanish scholars29 have reached a consensus that UCTs are not 
the appropriate tool for determining the adequacy of the contract price 
and remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in return. 
Spanish law calls for complete freedom of parties to determine 
contract prices, and therefore, there are no remedies30 for seeking a fair 
price.31 Thus, the control assessment of fairness is not about the 
adequacy of the price, which is separate from the possibility of 
assessing unfairness, but about the way some clauses help to determine 
the total price that consumers have to pay for the loan. This is precisely 
why many SCTs in mortgage loans might be considered unfair.32 
                                                 
28    See IMMACULADA BARRAL VIÑALS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE 
CONSUMO, ABUSIVAS POR DESEQUILIBRIO IMPORTANTE, PERO NO IMPORTA LA 
CANTIDAD (2014) (detailing a discussion on legal imbalance not being an economic 
imbalance in the ECJ decisions). 
29   See SERGIO CÁMARA LAPUENTE, EL CONTROL SOBRE LAS CLÁUSULAS 
“ABUSIVAS” SOBRE ELEMENTOS ESENCIALES DEL CONTRATO 71 (Thompson-
Aranzadi ed., 2006) (discussing the tension between unlimited freedom to negotiate 
the contract price and social justice). 
30   An exception to the general rule that no remedies exist for seeking a 
fair contract price is the laesio ultra dimidium in Catalonia for immovable property 
under certain circumstances.  This exception, however, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
31   See IGNASI FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, PABLO IZQUIERDO WHITE, 
ADELA RODRIGUEZ SERRA & GUILLEM SOLER SOLÉ, CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA 
CONTRATACIÓN BANCARIA 86 (2014) (calling for the impossibility of  controlling the 
price by the fairness test). Nevertheless, the argumentation cited deals precisely with 
the idea of  adequacy between the price and the services and goods supplied. See also 
LAPUENTE, supra note 29, at 71 (discussing the liberal doctrine of  freedom of  pricing 
and the social justice of  the contract). However, we understand that the thesis of  
social intervention of  the contract exceeds the issue of  unfair terms and seeks, not 
to determine whether there is an imbalance in a specific contract, but rather to restore 
a prior balance when starting from the premise that both parties have very different 
powers of  negotiation. 
32   Article 32 of  the Directive on Consumer Rights inserts Article 8 to the 
UCT Directive, stating that when a Member State adopts provisions in accordance 
with Article 8, it must inform the Commission, especially if  those provisions “extend 
the unfairness assessment to . . . the adequacy of  the price or remuneration.” Council 
Directive 2011/83, on Consumer Rights, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU), amending 
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, and Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L 
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In terms of remunerative rates of interest, it should be stressed 
that control of the amount, if any, is concerned directly with assessing 
the adequacy of the service provided against the remuneration. In 
short, the control of the amount impacts pricing freedom. Article 1 of 
the Repression of Usury Act of 23 of July 1908 governs the 
determination of whether the remunerative rate of interest is excessive 
or not.33 The Usury Act is useful for controlling the adequacy of the 
loan price because it mandates that the lending of money cannot be 
considered binding where there is an “interest notoriously higher than 
the normal price of money or clearly out of proportion in the 
circumstances of the case, or leonine. . .”34 However, when the lending 
is excessive or leonine, the loan is void in its entirety. Thus, the 
requirements of the Usury Act differ from the unfairness test, under 
which only the unfair clauses would be non-binding. In short, there is 
a specific tool in Spanish law for analysing when the price of the loan 
is excessive, namely, the adequacy of the price, which lies outside the 
scope of laws that address UCTs. 
An important case that addresses the issue of price control is 
the Judgement of 9 May 2013,35 a T.S. decision which was published 
shortly after the ECJ decided Aziz. The T.S. held that, although the 
rate of default interest constitutes part of the main subject matter of 
the contract, it can only be deemed unfair if the clause lacks 
transparency. These issues are discussed below in section IV, sub-
                                                 
171) 12 (EC), and repealing Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EC) and 
Council Directive 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC). The Directive on Consumer 
Rights was transposed by the Spanish legislature in the Consumer Protection Act, 
(B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain), amending TRLGDCU. Importantly, note that Article 8 
does not deal directly with the price as the main subject matter of  the contract, but 
rather with the adequacy of  the price or remuneration.  
33   Represión de la Usura (Usury Repression Act) (B.O.E. 1908, 206) 
(Spain) [hereinafter Usury Repression Act]. 
34   Nevertheless, the main idea of  the Usury Repression Act is to provide 
a subjective approach by taking into account the personal characteristics of  the 
debtor in determining whether the loan is usurious or not. See Immaculada Barral-
Viñals, Freedom of  Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer Law on 
Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny, James Devenney & 
Lorna Fox O’Mahony eds., 2010) (relating the concept of  unconscionability in 
common law and how this Act might be considered the first Spanish law protecting 
the weak part of  the contract).  
35   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain) 
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section C in conjunction with the criteria for determining fairness, 
because unlike remunerative interest rates, default interest rates do not 
form part of the price. Instead, default interest rates are part of the 
compensation for the eventual damage suffered by the creditor 
because of non-payment. In other words, these rates fall outside the 
notion of price and, as such, are susceptible to an unfairness test.36 
These T.S. cases permit application of the fairness test to any 
kind of clause in a mortgage loan, and this application should be the 
first step in considering individual clauses typically included in 
mortgage loan agreements in Spain. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR DEALING WITH THE CONCEPT OF 
“UNFAIRNESS” 
The ECJ has issued a number of guidelines on determining the 
fairness of SCTs. These guidelines are only of persuasive authority for 
judges in national courts because the Court in Luxembourg only gives 
instructions to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation 
of the scope of the fairness control provided in the UCT Directive.37 
In Aziz, however, the ECJ provided national courts with direct 
guidance—which has been cited in subsequent cases such as 
Constructora Principado—for analysing SCTs. All in all, the ECJ analyses 
                                                 
36   MARIA CARMEN GONZALEZ CARRASCO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE 
CONSUMO, LA CLÁUSULA QUE IMPONE UN INTERÉS DE DEMORA 
DESPROPORCIONADO DETERMINA LA APRECIACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LA NULIDAD 
DE LA MISMA SIN POSIBILIDAD DE ONTEGRACIÓN JUDICIAL(2013).  
37   The judgments that stress the idea that the ECJ only gives instructions 
to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation of the scope of the 
fairness control provided in the UCT Directive are numerous. See Case C-243/08, 
Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, 2009 E.C.R. I-04713; Case C-137/08, 
VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneide, 2010 E.C.R. I-10847; Case C-92/11, 
RWE Vertrieb AG v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 4659 (Mar. 21, 2013). A summary of  this construction  can be found 
in Case C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., 
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4104 (Apr. 26, 2012) (“it is for that [national] court 
to determine, in light of  those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is 
actually unfair in the circumstances of  the case . . . . It is thus clear that the Court of  
Justice must limit itself, in its response, to providing the referring court with the 
indications which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the 
term at issue is unfair.”).  
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three different clauses used in virtually all mortgage loan agreements. 
These clauses are discussed separately below. 
A. The “Early Maturity of the Loan” Clause 
The “early maturity” clause is an SCT that confers on the bank 
the right to call in the totality of the loan on expiry of a stipulated time 
limit where the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation to pay any part of 
the principal or the interest on the loan. This clause implies the 
acceleration of the loan due to any kind of non-compliance. The ECJ 
in Aziz referred to this clause as the “acceleration clause.” 
There is considerable variety of early maturity clauses used for 
a range of circumstances, such as when a debtor enters into insolvency 
proceedings and in the sale of an immovable property. The discussion 
in this section focuses on the type of early maturity clause considered 
in the case brought before the ECJ: one that provides for early maturity 
on account of non-payment of a loan installment. For this clause to 
take effect, there must be a failure to comply with an obligation that is 
of essential importance in the contractual relationship, such as non-
payment in due time by the borrower.38 But, the substantive issue 
discussed by the ECJ was the early maturity that occurred, or could 
occur, as a consequence of the non-payment of a single installment, 
and whether the early maturity clause may be considered unfair 
because of being disproportionate. The problem is not the possibility 
of calling in the loan because of the debtor’s non-compliance. Rather, 
the problem is the imbalance between the term and the amount of the 
loan, and the non-payment of a single installment.39 Some Spanish 
scholars argue that, since early maturity for non-compliance is 
authorized by Spanish regulations on UCTs,40 the central problem is 
whether absolute non-compliance can be assumed after defaulting on 
just one installment.41 The meaning of non-payment is not defined in 
                                                 
38   See, e.g. S.T.S., Dec. 16, 2009 (R.J., No. 8466/2009) (Spain).  
39   See PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ ESPIN, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, 
ES ABUSIVA LA CLÁUSULA DE VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO POR IMPAGO DE UNA 
CUOTA DE LA HIPOTECA (2013). 
40   TRLGDCU art. 85(4) (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
41   See Carlos Ballugera Gómez, Carácter Abusivo del Vencimiento Anticipado 
por Impago de una Sola Suota del Préstamo Hipotecario en la STS de 16 de Diciembre de 2009, 
7507 DIARIO LA LEY 10, 10 (2010); Maria Teresa Alonso Pérez, Cláusulas Frecuentes 
en Préstamos Hipotecarios para Adquisición de Vivienda: Cláusula Suelo, Cláusula de 
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the regulations. However, the ECJ provides three criteria –marked in 
bold- for determining whether the non-compliance is sufficiently 
serious: “whether that right is provided for in cases in which such non-
compliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount 
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant 
applicable rules and whether national law provides for adequate 
and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a 
term to remedy the effects of the loan being called in.”42 
Even though the ECJ does not conclude whether this clause is 
unfair, its criteria reflects the normal circumstances of a mortgage loan 
for a family home in Spain. Typically, banks in Spain grant mortgage 
loans with pay back time of at least thirty years.43 As such, non-
payment of a single monthly installment, without more, does not 
appear to be a severe violation of the borrower’s payment obligation. 
In line with these criteria, the Spanish legislature set a limit on 
the maximum delay of payment, beyond which would indicate a 
serious intention of the borrower to breach his payment obligation. In 
2013, the legislature promulgated Act 1/2013,44 which modifies Article 
693(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to require a finding of non-
compliance with the loan agreement based on non-payment of 
monthly installments for three or more months or its equivalent if the 
terms are not quantified in a monthly basis. 
Act 1/2013 also takes into account the second criterion 
provided by the ECJ, and addresses the question of whether the right 
to call in the loan for the non-payment of one installment derogates 
from the relevant applicable rules. If there is no early maturity clause 
in the contract, the mortgage can only be executed following the 
“essential non-compliance” in the terms provided by Article 1124 
C.C.,45 which seems to require more than the non-payment of a single 
                                                 
Vencimiento anticipado y Cláusula de Cntereses Moratorios Excesivamente Elevados, in 
VIVIENDA Y CRISIS ECONÓMICA 183 (María Teresa Alsonso Pérez ed., 2014). 
42   L.E. CIV art. 693(2) (Spain). 
43  See, e.g., Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) (the mortgage loan at issue was for thirty-
three years). 
44   See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social 
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).   
45   C.C. art. 1124 (Spain).  
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installment. Thus, by specifically requiring three months of non-
payment, Act 1/2013 establishes a criterion in which non-compliance 
is of essential importance. 
However, the last criterion provided by the ECJ on the need 
to examine whether there are adequate means to remedy the effects of 
the clause is largely ineffective. Article 693(3) of Code of Civil 
Procedure clearly provides for the possibility of the debtor thwarting 
the execution of the mortgage by paying the due installments, a power 
conceded to the debtor of the mortgage on the family home, without 
the consent of the creditor. Therefore, in light of the effectiveness of 
reacting to the implementation of the clause, the Spanish legal system 
provides reasonable solutions to ensure the clause is not deemed 
unfair. 
Act 1/2013 establishes that, in the absence of non-payment for 
at least three months, the judge cannot proceed to foreclosure. 
However, the question remains as to whether, even if the bank has 
declared the loan is expired after the minimum time limit for 
compliance established by law, the contract contains a clause for early 
maturity for non-payment of a single installment. Courts are likely to 
declare this clause unfair and therefore not binding on the debtor, in 
which case there would be a stay on mortgage foreclosure due to the 
lack of necessary procedural prerequisites, i.e., the credit has not fallen 
due.46 Here, however, judges must decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the elements listed above for determining whether a clause is 
unfair are present. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure does not make 
early maturity clauses unfair only upon one or two non-payments. 
Instead, the Code of Civil Procedure only limits the foreclosure of the 
mortgage to three unpaid installments, which indicates a poor 
understanding of the judgment in Aziz. 
B. The Clause for Unilateral Quantification of the Amount Owed 
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed allow 
banks to immediately and unilaterally determine the balance of a loan 
by submitting a certificate indicating the amount owed. This clause is 
                                                 
46  Encarna Cordero, Y Ahora Viene lo Difícil: ¿Cómo Controlar en el Ejecutivo 
Hipotecario el Carácter Abusivo de la Cláusula?, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE 
CONSUMO 26 (2013). 
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essential to the security provided by a mortgage because it provides the 
creditor with recourse to the procedures set out in Article 572(2) of 
Code of Civil Procedure.47 Article 572(2) requires providing for the 
presentation of certification of the amount owed, duly verified before 
a notary, to determine the outstanding balance to proceed to 
enforcement. If such certification does not exist, the enforcement 
proceedings cannot be initiated owing to the absence of one of the 
procedural requisites, viz., the liquidity of the debt.48 Prior to the 
enforcement proceeding, the debtor would be required to initiate a 
declaratory proceeding to establish the amount due. Therefore, the law 
allows unilateral declaration to establish the liquidity of the debt. 
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed might 
seem unfair because they require only unilateral declaration by the 
bank. However, such a clause whose requirements and effects are 
provided for by procedural legislation49 can hardly be considered unfair 
provided that all the requirements and effects of the clause are clear. 
In fact, this was the approach used by the Advocate General in Aziz, 
which highlights the essential character of this type of SCT for 
initiating enforcement.50 He also pointed out the need to analyze the 
rules of this procedure and, in particular, the debtor’s power of 
challenge, which appears guaranteed when claiming more than is due 
as regulated in Art. 558 Code of Civil Procedure.51 
Aziz, however, deviates from Advocate General opinion for 
analyzing the procedures of mortgage enforcement proceedings and 
directly adopts the comparison with national legislation in the absence 
of an agreement.52 Yet, without a unilateral determination clause, 
                                                 
47   L.E. CIV.art. 572(2) (Spain).  
48   See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLENA, supra note 31, at 175.  
49   L.E. CIV. art. 572 (Spain).  
50   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).  
51   L.E. CIV. art. 558 (Spain). 
52   Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, at ¶ 75 (“With regard, finally, to 
the term concerning the unilateral determination by the lender of  the amount of  the 
unpaid debt, linked to the possibility of  initiating mortgage enforcement 
proceedings, it must be held that, taking into account paragraph 1(q) of  the Annex 
to the directive and the criteria contained in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) thereof, the 
referring court must in particular assess whether and, if  appropriate, to what extent, 
the term in question derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of  agreement 
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enforcement proceedings may not be initiated, so, this SCT is clearly 
carrying consequences detrimental to the consumer. Therefore, Aziz 
indicates that the unilateral declaration of the amount is unfair, since 
this requires an agreement that derogates the applicable law. In the 
absence of an agreement, the law provides for the creditor to initiate 
declaratory proceedings to settle the debt, thus losing the advantages 
of the mortgage enforcement, which is one of the lender’s most 
obvious advantages. Enforcement based on unilateral declaration of 
the amount owed offers few safeguards for the debtor, because 
unilateral declaration does not contain a phase in which objections 
might be lodged, nor is it corrected by the intervention of the notary. 
In short, in light of Spanish procedural law, it seems more effective to 
address the issue of the clauses for unilateral qualification of the 
amount owed from the perspective of the guarantee of procedures 
rather than from that of the unfair nature of the clause itself. 
C. Disproportionate Default Interest Rate Clause 
The disproportionate default interest rate clause is also 
analyzed in Aziz. Unlike the remunerative rate of interest, which forms 
part of the price, the default interest is the price (compensation) for 
the debtor’s failure to pay, which derives from the default and is 
provided for under Article 1108 C.C.53 Thus, as indicated in Section 
III, the critical issue is not whether it is possible to control the content 
of the clause. Rather, the issue is whether the interest rate is 
disproportionate, and because of that, become unfair. 
The ECJ opined in Aziz that the rate of default interest should 
be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of its objectives: so, a 
disproportioned default interest rate cannot be imposed because it 
settles a disproportionate compensation. The ECJ establishes two 
criteria for establishing a proportionate default interest rate: first, a 
comparison with what is provided for under national law in the 
absence of any agreement; and second, the rate of default interest 
applicable in art. 1108 Civil Code.54 Clearly, the agreement of a default 
                                                 
between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the consumer, given the 
procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action and exercise rights of  the 
defence.”). 
53  C.C. art. 1108 (Spain). 
54   See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS,¶ 74 (“regarding the term 
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interest rate alters the legal framework under Article 1108 C.C., which 
provides that the legal interest rate should be four percent,55 a figure 
that is well above the usual percentage in mortgages. The question is 
what standard of comparison should be employed, and there are at 
least three possible answers: first, to take Article 1108 C.C., which 
establishes the legal interest rate of borrowing in the event of no 
agreement,56 as a point of reference; second, to apply in accordance 
with Spanish legislation the limit on the legal interest rate of tacit 
overdrafts on personal loans subject to Article 20(4) LCC,57 which is 
2.5 times the legal interest rate;58 and third, to compare the 
remunerative rate of interest of the loan itself with the default interest 
rate. 
Consumers often default on their loan payments at the risk of 
foreclosure proceedings and find themselves unable to pay high rates 
of default interest. Therefore, RD-L 6/2012, before providing a ruling 
in the Aziz case, determined an upper limit for default interest rate in 
mortgage foreclosures affecting debtors with few resources (Article 4 
RD-L 6/2012).59 This regulation provides for the so-called “debtor on 
the threshold of social exclusion,” who enjoys special protection and 
                                                 
concerning the fixing of  default interest, it should be recalled that, in light of  
paragraph 1(e) of  the Annex to the Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 3(1) 
and 4(1) of  the directive, the national court must assess in particular, as stated by the 
Advocate General in points 85 to 87 of  her Opinion; first, the rules of  national law 
which would apply to the relationship between the parties, in the event of  no 
agreement having been reached in the contract in question or in other consumer 
contracts of  that type; and, second, the rate of  default interest laid down, compared 
with the statutory interest rate, in order to determine whether it is appropriate for 
securing the attainment of  the objectives pursued by it in the Member State 
concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them”). See also Case 
C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarine de Man Garabito v. Jahani BV, 
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2538 (May 30, 2013). 
55   State Budget 2014 (B.O.E. 2013, 309) (Spain) (stating the state budget 
for 2014. Additional disposition 32).  
56   C.C. art. 1108 (Spain). 
57   Consumer Credit Act art. 9 (B.O.E. 1995, 72) (Spain) (derogated by 
Consumer Credit Act (B.O.E.  2011, 151) (Spain) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Act]. 
Neither of  the two statutes apply to mortgage loan agreements. 
58   See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, supra note 31, at 145. This criterion 
has been followed by provincial courts seeking a limit in the default interest rate in 
the face of  recent legal reforms. 
59   Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E. 
2012, 60) (Spain).   
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is limited to the remunerative interest agreed to by parties at the time 
of making the loan agreement plus 2.5% of the loan principal. 
Nevertheless, the requirements for being recognized as this type of 
debtor are cumbersome and complicated, and few debtors are deemed 
eligible for this protection. 
The ceiling on default interest in Article 114 LH, amended by 
Law 1/2013 limits default interest to a rate that is three times the 
statutory interest rate when the mortgage is for the acquisition of the 
main residence and the mortgage agreement has been secured on that 
residence. Thus, a solution was implemented to depart from the 
statutory interest rate provided by the C.C. and to increase the ceiling 
on personal loans. Today, there is a legal limit on interest rates when 
the rate has been agreed to in a new mortgage contract. Hence, 
disposicion trasitoria (DT) 2 of Act 1/2013 applies this limit to 
foreclosures that are pending or to be initiated after the effective date 
of Act 1/2013 that will have a greater impact as a lot of cases can be 
in its scope of application.60  This indicates that the court clerk or 
notary will recalculate the rate of interest if it exceeds the statutory 
limit. As such, DT 2 of Act 1/2013 seems to represent an effort to 
moderate the clause in opposition to ECJ case law and the provisions 
in Article 85 TRLGDCU, which will be further discussed in Section V 
below. 
Another interesting aspect of disproportionate default interest 
rate clauses concerns the proceedings taken when an interest rate is 
declared unfair and therefore void. The provincial courts have adopted 
two approaches to this issue. The first approach is to apply a zero 
interest rate if a court declares the default interest rate void as 
disproportionately high and the judge is unable to moderate the clause, 
as demonstrated in Section V. The second approach is to apply Article 
1108 C.C., which provides that, in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties, the rate of default interest shall be the statutory 
interest rate. I favor this second approach because the supplementary 
application of Article 1108 C.C. does not constitute a revision of the 
clause, but only a use of the statutory interest rate in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties, defined as lack of foresight or 
                                                 
60   See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social 
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).  
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unenforceability by other cause.61 The logic of Article 1108 C.C. is to 
provide a model for the quantification of the legal obligation for paying 
default interest, which is used by the ECJ as a reference for finding 
unfairness. The agreement on a default interest rate modifies the 
application of this precept.62 
D. The “Floor” Clause 
In Spain, most loan agreements for purchasing a family home 
charge a variable interest rate. A “floor” clause affects the variability of 
a loan by providing a fixed interest rate. Floor clauses do not allow 
lower rates of interest to be applied, even if a lower rate is available 
under the Euribor or other mechanism of calculation. Financial 
institutions use floor clauses to protect themselves against possible 
falls in the Euribor. Hence, the potential unfairness of floor clauses 
has been called into question because such clauses cause an imbalance 
in the contract, since the debtor is unable to benefit from interest rate 
cuts lower than the limit established by the floor clause, and it can be 
deemed unfair because the lack of financial knowledge of the debtor 
means he may be unaware that the clause might be applied, which has 
occurred during the present economic crisis. Although the ECJ has not 
addressed the fairness of floor clauses, the T.S. ruled on this issue in 
the May 9, 201363 and September 8, 2014 decisions64 and applied much 
more restrictive criteria. 
The T.S. cases considered floor clauses from two points of 
view. The first, which is contrary to the interpretation by the ECJ in 
Aziz, is that “floor” clauses, insofar as they determine the contract 
price, cannot be considered unfair. The second is that floor clauses can 
only be considered invalid for lack of transparency. Thus, the test for 
fairness is its inclusion within the loan agreement (Articles 5 and 7 
LCGC and 80 of TRLGDCU), which is understood to be made when 
                                                 
61   See Miguel Martin Casals, Les Clauses Abusives Dans le Projet de Cadre 
Commun de Reference, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES: APPROCHES CROISEES FRANCO-
ESPAGNOLES 73 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud, & Elena Lauroba eds., 2012) (pointing 
out that the contract remains when a clause is unfair either because the clause is not 
essential to the contract’s purpose or because the law includes a defective application 
of  the norm. In our case, the defective norm is C.C. art. 1108).  
62   See GONZALEZ CARRASCO, supra note 36, at 4.  
63 See S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).  
64 See S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R.J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).  
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the bank complies with all previously established information and 
documentation requirements.65 Surprisingly, the T.S. checks the 
transparency of contractual clauses that cannot be deemed unfair as 
they form part of the price in function of the criterion of transparency 
in what is known as “double filter transparency”. Indeed, this criterion 
for the transparency of contract clauses is not contemplated by Article 
82 TRLGDCU, which is limited to requiring only that the content of 
the clauses shall not be “contrary to the requirement of good faith” or 
“cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer and user.” 
Nor does Article 3 of the UCT Directive require a check on the 
transparency of contract clauses. Thus, the transparency control in 
Spanish law is effectively a control of the incorporation of general 
contract conditions, and not a control over the fairness of the SCT.66 
Indeed, the control of accessibility tackles the issue of fairness more 
directly than the control of transparency because the former is based 
on whether the consumer had the opportunity of knowing the content, 
while the latter is only a posterior analysis of whether the clause is 
worded clearly or not. Further, even if the wording of the contract term 
is unclear, it will be ineffective rather than unfair.67 
In practice, the T.S. adopts the ECJ’s interpretation of the 
concept of unfairness due to a lack of transparency, which provides 
that the clarity of the contract language requires the lender to fulfill its 
affirmative duty of supplying sufficient information for the consumer 
to appreciate the circumstances related to contract formation.68 This 
requirement is grounded in the idea that the test for unfairness should 
require that consumers understand the economic significance of the 
contract terms. This is precisely the concept that the T.S. adopts in 
                                                 
65 See Orden Sobre Transparencia de las Condiciones Financieras de los 
préstamos hiptecarios (May 5, 1994) (B.O.E. 1994/112) (on transparency of  the 
financial conditions of  mortgage loans or credits) (derogated by Orden 
EHA/2899/2011, de Transparencia y Protección del cliente de servicios bancarios 
(Oct. 28, 2011) (B.O.E. 2011/261) (on transparency and protection of  bank clients)). 
66   FRANCISCO PERTÍÑEZ VÍLCHEZ, LAS CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS POR UN 
DEFECTO DE TRANSPARENCIA (2004). 
67   See Consumer Protection Act art. 10 (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain) 
(amended to require clarity with the material delivery of  the conditions).  
68   See Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra 
note 37; Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival 
of  the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 C.M.L.R. 771, 771-808 (2014).  
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determining the lack of transparency: the floor clause is void due to a 
lack of transparency because such a clause prevents the consumer from 
understanding the economic significance of the loan. However, the 
problem is that both transparency and reporting obligations to 
highlight the economic significance of the contract are for the ECJ, 
examples of substantive criteria for determining the unfair nature of a 
clause because they generate imbalance and are contrary to good faith, 
regardless of the clarity of writing. In other words, the argument of the 
economic importance of the contract is useful, but then we talk about 
content control, which is precisely what the T.S. rejects at the 
beginning of its argument, indicating that the floor clause refers to an 
essential contract element. In my opinion, it is more useful to start 
from the fact that floor clauses are unfair terms, and avoid the question 
of transparency because the content control would address the fairness 
issue in a more direct manner. 
IV. ON THE EFFECTS OF UNFAIRNESS: NON-REVISION AND FULL 
RESTITUTION 
Another important issue concerns the difference between the 
way in which the Spanish legislature and the T.S. interpret the effects 
of unfair terms and the doctrine established by the ECJ. First, until 
2013, the TRLGDCU had authorized judges to integrate terms that 
had been declared unfair. Second, the T.S., in its 9 May, 2013 
decision,69 stated that the law did not require restitution of the amounts 
paid under a “floor clause” that had been declared unfair due to a lack 
of transparency. Here, the discussion will focus on these two points: 
the non-revision of an unfair contract term, and the restitution effect 
when it is declared unfair. 
A. Non-revision of an Unfair Contract Term 
An even more surprising issue that arises from the 
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature is that 
Article 85 of RD 1/2007 allowed Spanish courts to revise unfair 
clauses. However, as reported in a number of ECJ judgments,70 
                                                 
69   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).   
70   Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť s. r. o. v. Iveta Korčkovská, 2010 E.C.R. I-
11557.  
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revision of UCTs by courts is not permissible under Article 6 of the 
UCT Directive.71 
In 2014, the Spanish legislature amended the TRLGDCU: L 
3/2014, which transposes the 2011 Directive on consumer rights, 
provides in Article 27 that unfair terms are null and void and cannot 
be revised by judges: Article 27 amends  Article 83 of TRLGDCU. So, 
judges are not permitted to revise unfair contract terms because the 
supplier or seller bears the risk of the use of the clause, i.e., the supplier 
or seller cannot benefit from a partial implementation of the agreement 
when the clause is unfair.72 
This subject is currently of great interest because of its effects 
on default interest clauses. Besides what has been discussed regarding 
the application of the statutory limit provided in art. 1108 C.C. in the 
absence of agreement, there is another controversial provision, the DT 
2 1/2013 that appears to permit revision by judges upon finding UCTs. 
DT 2 1/2013, which amends Article 114 LH, grants the court clerk or 
notary the power to authorize the creditor to recalculate interest if the 
clerk or notary finds that the default interest clause exceeds the 
statutory limit in C.C. This rule, the constitutionality of which has been 
questioned,73 seems to permit the revision of a term that is no longer 
                                                 
71   See, e.g., Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín 
Caldéron Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4274 (June 14, 2012). “Article 6(1) 
of  Directive 93/13 cannot be understood as allowing the national court, in the case 
where it finds that there is an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or 
supplier and a consumer, to revise the content of  that term instead of  merely setting 
aside its application to the consumer.” Id. at ¶ 71. In addition, it is for the court to 
ascertain what which national rules are applicable to the dispute and to take the whole 
body of  domestic law into consideration and apply the interpretative methods 
recognized by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Article 6(1) of  Directive 
93/13 is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective 
pursued by it. Id. at ¶ 72.  See also Case C-282/10, Dominguez v. Centre Informatique 
du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4658, ¶ 27 (January 24, 
2012). The answer to the second question is that Article 6(1) of  Directive 93/13 
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of  a Member State, such as Article 83 
of  Legislative Decree 1/2007, which allows a national court, if  it declares void an 
unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, to 
modify that contract by revising the content of  that term. Banco Español de Crédito 
v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274. 
72   See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 68, at 793.  
73   Spain’s Constitutional Court has admitted application 4985-2013, 
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permitted under Article 83 TRLGDCU. If the interest rate in the SCT 
exceeds the statutory maximum, its unfairness can be assessed by the 
court or the debtor can make the corresponding allegation so the 
interest rate is not applied. 
B. Full Restitution 
The unfairness of a term might imply that the debtor has paid 
more than what he should have been paid, so he is entitled to 
restitution in accordance with the regulations of each Member State. 
Restitution is clearly recognized by the ECJ.74 The T.S., however, has 
held that the annulment of floor clauses is not retroactive, so 
restitution is not warranted.75 Yet, Article 1303 C.C.76 provides that the 
nullity involves recovery of benefits and that it acts ex tunc. Besides this 
rather unusual ruling－or “invention”－of non-retroactive annulment, 
the T.S.’s holding in judgement 9 May, 2013 has no legal basis.77 The 
T.S. judgement is presenting four arguments: First, the existence of 
rules that do not involve retroactivity in case of annulment, but it is 
clear that in the case of unfair terms, there is no reason to deviate from 
the general system. Second, the lack of transparency does not entail 
annulment because the clause could be lawful. However, the reasoning 
for this argument is clearly circular because the term is either unfair for 
lack of transparency as held by the T.S., or the term is unfair but does 
not lack transparency, in which case the law permits annulment. Third, 
judges may make a retroactive revision. However, this possibility was 
removed by the amendment of Art. 83 TRLGDCU, which was 
promulgated after the T.S. judgment.78 
Finally, the only argument of any weight, although not a legal 
argument, is the “risk of serious difficulties in the economic public 
                                                 
presented by more than fifty members of  parliament from the Socialist Group, 
against this precept. Also the judge in the Avilés court of  first instance (nº 7) has 
presented a claim of  unconstitutionality.   
74  Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra 
note 37; Case C-397/11, Joros v. Aegon, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2540 (July 
18, 2013).  
75   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain). 
76   C.C. art. 1303 (Spain).  
77   For an impeccable analysis, see Alonso Perez, supra note 41, at 170.  
78   TRLGDCU art. 83 (B.O.E. 2007, 287). 
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order.”79 So, the T.S. permitted revision of the amount of the 
execution, but did not allow recovery of the amounts unduly paid. 
V. EXPLORING THE RESULTS OF UNFAIRNESS CRITERIA IN 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS 
The most significant consequence of Aziz is the promulgation 
of Act 1/2013 to reform mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Indeed, 
besides the unfair nature of certain clauses, Aziz holds that the 
mortgage foreclosure process, by not permitting the control of unfair 
terms, is inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness in the UCT 
Directive.80 Aziz also points out that the rules of Member States 
contradict those of the Community if they do not provide for the 
possibility of controlling unfair terms in foreclosure proceedings, or if 
these proceedings cannot be suspended providing interim relief, if the 
unfair nature of these terms is discussed in a declaratory judgment.81 
Although the law regulates the effects of an unfair contract term in 
these proceedings, the legislation on unfair terms remains the same: 
the reforms have led to the redrafting of the Mortgage Act (Article 
129) in those cases in which the foreclosure is made extrajudicially 
before a notary. In these cases, the notary has control of the unfair 
terms and has the authority to suspend the sale of the mortgaged 
property if a claim on the UCT has been filed.82 
For practical purposes, greater importance should be attached 
to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, which are widely 
used by lawyers to identify the effect of suspending foreclosure 
proceedings, although the suspension only delays the loss of the 
mortgagor’s house as he is unable to repay the loan.83 Two 
amendments have been made to the Code of Civil Procedure. First, 
the Code directly foresees an avenue for controlling the terms by the 
                                                 
79   S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013, ¶ 293) (Spain).  
80   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) 
81   Id. 
82   See Mortgage Act art. 129 (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain).  
83  Andres Dominguez Luelmo, La STJUE de 14 de Marzo De 2013: 
Dificultades de Interpretación y aplicación por los Tribunales, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE 
DERECHO DE CONSUMO 5 (2013). 
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judge with a pre-hearing process,84 the need for which has been called 
into question.85 The pre-hearing process is resolved via a judicial writ 
in which the decision is made as to whether to proceed with the 
foreclosure as presented given the absence of any unfair terms; or, if 
unfair terms are thought to exist, foreclosure can be denied if the unfair 
term is the basis for the foreclosure or to reach an agreement, but for 
a smaller amount, if the term only affects the amount.86 
Second, a procedural step was introduced to enable the debtor 
to invoke the unfairness of a term, which is a direct consequence of 
Aziz: the possibility of objecting to foreclosure because of the 
existence of an unfair term in the loan agreement.87 These proceedings 
(incidente de oposicion) only permit an allegation of the unfairness of a 
term that either allows the proceedings to be stayed, or for the amount 
due to be modified, while all other remedies must be sought in 
declaratory proceedings.88 If the judge finds the clause to be fair, the 
foreclosure proceedings continue; otherwise, the judge must either 
dismiss the proceedings on grounds that the term forms the basis of 
the foreclosure or continue the proceeding for a smaller amount of 
money.89 The first draft of this incidente de oposición only allows the bank 
to appeal against the writ, which is the subject of the recent judgment 
of the ECJ of 17 July 2014.90 The response of the Spanish legislature, 
in this case, has been nothing short of instantaneous: RD Law 
                                                 
84   L.E. Civ., art. 552.1, 681.1 (Spain).  
85  Alberto Lafuente Torralba, El Control de las Cláusulas Abusivas en la 
Ejecución Hipotecaria: Luces y Sombras de la Regulación Legal, in VIVIENDA Y CRISIS 
ECONÓMICA 232 (Maria Teresa Alonso Perez ed., 2014). 
86   L.E. Civ., supra note 42, art. 561.1.3, 695.3.  
87   According to Carrasco Perera a coherent solution would be to allow 
the judge to arbitrate and then to open contentious proceedings, but not to duplicate 
the routes available for controlling unfairness. See ANGEL FRANCISCO CARRASCO 
PERERA, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, LA LEY 1/2013, DE 14 DE MAYO, DE 
REFORMA HIPOTECARIA Y LA ARTICULACIÓN PROCESAL DEL CONTROL SOBRE 
CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA EJECUCIÓN HIPOTECARIA (2013).  
88   L.E. Civ. art. 557.1.7, 695.1.4 (Spain). 
89   Id. at art. 695.3. 
90   Case C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María del Carmen 
Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (July 17, 2014), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?td=ALL&language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-
169/14. 
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11/2014, of 5 September, amending Art. 695 Code of Civil Procedure, 
allows both parties the right of appeal.91 
Thus, both in the judge’s assessment of unfairness and the 
incidente de oposicion, the possibility of avoiding the foreclosure process 
by analysing the unfairness of the contract terms so far is discrete. 
Indeed, the appreciation of the early maturity clause is the basis of this 
incidente de oposición, because if the clause is declared invalid, the debt is 
not due and cannot be executed; however, this SCT can hardly be 
regarded as unfair. The unfairness of a unilateral declaration of a debt 
clause suspends foreclosure, because the debt would have no liquidity 
and cannot be executed. Moreover, neither the unfairness of the 
default interest clause nor the “floor clause” permits proceedings to be 
suspended. The unfairness of such clauses only results in modifications 
to the amount due, and in the latter case, involving only very small 
amounts relative to the sum for which foreclosure is executed, as 
occurred in Aziz. 
Moreover, the criteria of unfairness provided by the ECJ can 
be used to determine whether a clause is unfair in declaratory 
proceedings. In addition, Aziz focused on the assumption that, after 
initiating foreclosure proceedings–and without the legal means to 
analyze the fairness–the debtor can initiate declaratory proceedings 
concerning the existence of unfair terms that lack suspensory effect of 
the foreclosure proceedings. The bottom line is that the judge in 
declaratory proceedings could grant interim relief92 –the staying of 
those enforcement proceedings and this possibility was explicitly 
accepted by the ECJ93. However, the Spanish legislature has not 
addressed this issue, so the possibility of a suspensory effect in the 
foreclosure proceeding continues to be of uncertain application given 
the rigidity of the precepts that govern the enforcement process. This 
is unfortunate because declaratory proceedings are a better forum for 
discussing the scope of an unfair term than foreclosure proceedings. 
                                                 
91   Urgent Insolvency Matters (B.O.E. 2014, 217) (Spain).  
92   See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex 
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013). 
93   See id. at ¶ 77.  
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CONCLUSION 
The legal developments following Aziz on the control of 
unfair SCTs have been somewhat limited. However, these 
developments highlight the difference between European consumer 
protection law and domestic procedural law with regard to 
enforcement proceedings and have given grounds for challenging the 
legal system and some lessons are to be learned: 
First, in Aziz, a consumer-friendly interpretation has been 
given to the UCT Directive which has led to the development of 
substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness in three SCT that almost 
every housing mortgage loan has in Spain: the early maturity of the 
loan, the unilateral declaration of the debt and the default interest rate. 
Second, coming from Aziz, various points at which the 
Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be revised have 
been identified: On the one hand, the non-revision of the unfair clause 
by the judge has been finally stayed by an amending of art. 83 
TRLGDCU, but it still remains in the foreclosure proceedings by the 
means of DT 2 Act 1/2013. That shows how the Spanish legislature 
has not understood the Aziz doctrine. On the other hand, the ECJ opts 
for a full restitution when a clause is deemed unfair, nevertheless that 
has not been the case in the two Spanish T.S. judgements referring to 
a floor clause considered unfair by lack of transparency. 
Third, the possibility of controlling UCTs in mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings has not become a reality. Even if Aziz states 
that a way of controlling fairness should be granted in the foreclosure 
proceedings, it is true that the clauses abovementioned have no deep 
impact on the possibility of staying the foreclosure, and in some cases 
–disproportioned default rate- are only able to low the amount of the 
debt. 
In short, the problem of defaulting on mortgage loan 
repayments is not strictly an issue of controlling UCTs, and consumer 
protection provides no more than indirect tools to stay the mortgage 
foreclosure. Given that many mortgagors find themselves unable to 
make their loan payments—and thus at risk of losing their homes—
shifting attention to UCT legislation has been helpful in seeking a stay 
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on foreclosure proceedings and the ECJ judgements have questioned 
the Spanish procedural law in mortgage foreclosures. Yet, problems 
still exist in areas such as the over-indebtedness of consumers (a 
question that the Spanish legislator has largely ignored); weak Spanish 
legislation protecting consumer rights with regard to financial products 
and the role of the Bank of Spain as regulator of the sector; and 
mortgage foreclosure regulations that provide the banks with many 
facilities of recovery while lenders may fail to clear their debt if the 
value of their home does not cover the total amount owed. Deeper 
research in these three mentioned areas is needed to find a legal 
solution to unpaid housing mortgages as a whole. 
 
